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Themistius as a Commentator on Aristotle:
Understanding and Appreciating his
Conception of Nous Pathetikos and Phantasia
Myrna Gabbe
UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

Of Themistius (ca. 317-ca. 385/87), Vanderspoel writes that he "was
one of the most important individuals in the fourth century AD. Yet his
life and work are poorly understood." I While Vanderspoel principally has in
mind Themistius's career as a politician and orator, his comments could as
easily be applied to his work as a philosopher. This study aims to recover an
appreciation of The mist ius's original and systematic contribution to solving
ptoblems in Aristotle's account of perception and cognition that vex, even
today, his interpreters.
As a teacher at Constantinople, Themistius composed paraphrases of
Aristotle's treatises, which were read and studied from Late Antiquity through
the Renaissance. 2 Arguably, his most significant work is his exegesis of De
Anima III 4 and 5-its impact can be seen quite clearly in Medieval and
Renaissance thought. 3 The estimation of recent scholars, however, is that
4
Themistian noetics is lacking in originality and impoverished in insight.
1. J. Vanderspoel, ThemistitlS and the Imperial COtm vii.
2. For a history of the transmission ofThemistius's texts, see R. Todd, "Themistius."
3. E. Mahoney, "Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James ofViterbo," 424, describes
Themistius as "one of the most important and inAuential of the late ancient commentators
on Asistotlc" owing to the inAuence that his paraphrase of the De Anima had on the Islamic
and Christian medieval philosophers. This paper of Mahoney details Themistius's inAuence
on Thomas Aquinas, James ofViterbo, Siger of Brabant and Henry Bate. See also G. Verbeke,
TbemistitlS, for Aquinas' appeal to Themistius's authority on the plurality of the productive
intellect. H. Davidson, Alforabi, Avieerma, and Averroes on Intellect, also illuminates the inAuence of this paraphrase on the Asabic philosophers and E. Mahoney, "Neoplatonism, the
Greek Commentators and Renaissance Asistotelianism," the impact of Themistian noeries on
Renaissance philosophy.
4. More precisely. this is the estimation ofO. Hamelin. though it is not markedly different
from H. Blu menthal's. See Hamelin, La theorie de ['intellect d'apres Aristote et ses commentateurs,
38-39. In a passing remark, Blumenthal comments: "Themistius, who. if not always a profound
interpreter of Asistotle, is to some extent free from the Neoplatonic inAuences which in his day
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Because Themistius generally stays close to Aristotle's texts he is regarded as a
Peripatetic philosopher despite the traces ofNeoplatonic doctrine in his treatises. 5 But he is criticized for failing to approach the text with an overarching
interpretive vision and, thus, for offering an interpretation that is piecemeal
and incoherent. 6 For this reason, his periodic appropriation ofNeoplatonic
doctrine adds fuel to the fire, since tl1e e appropriations are easily regarded
as symptomatic of an eclectic and unsystematic approach.
It is easy to see Themistius's treatment of no liS pathetikos (passive intellect)
as a case in point, since it is widely believed to be an egregious misreading
of the text. Themistius's passive intellect appears to be a mortal and corporeal third intellect alongside its immortal and incorporeal counterparts, the
potential and productive intellects. This interpretation stands in contrast to
the more received view that De Anima III 4 and 5 only treat of twO intellects: the productive intellect, detailed in III 5, and the potential intellect,
described principally in III 4 but referred to as nous pathetikos in the closing
lines ofIll 5.1 Furthermore, Themistius is regarded with suspicion, and creates confusion about his views, because he seems to attribute this if\tell ect
to both Theophrastus and Plato.
Themistius is not only a commentator on Aristotle; he is also one of our
main sources of Theophrastus on the intellect. Hence, it is important to

already dominated Greek phi losophy." H. Blumemhal, "Nco-Platonic lmerprecations ofAristotle
on Phrmtasia," 253. For other criticisms ofThemistius, see notes 6 and 8.
5. Blumenthal, Todd, Huby and Finamore, for instance, share the view that ll1emistius
is principally a Peripatetic philosopher. Blumenthal, "Photius on ll1emistius," offers a persuasive argument for this view, while the others let their views known in passing. Finamore's
chapter on Themistius is forthcoming, but see Todd, Themistills: 011 Aristotle's 011 the SOlll. 2,
and Huby, "Stages in the Development of Language About Aristotle's NOlls," 140. Ballerinux
and Mal10ney represent the opposing view. Ballcriallx, in "111emistills et I'exegese de la n06tique aristotclicienne," argues that Themistills's noeties are deeply influenced by Plotinlls. His
"111emistius et Ie Neoplatonisme" draws the san1e conclusion but this time on consideration
of his !lom pathitikos. His argument there will be considered in detail in section three of this
essay. See Mal10ney, "Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James ofViterbo," 264-66 notc 1,
for a detailed history of this debate.
6. Concerning ll1emisrius's account of DeAllima III 4 and 5, Hubywrites: "It cannot be said
that much of this helps us to underStand either Aristotle or IIOIIS, bur it illustrates Themistius's
interests and methods. He looks closely at each section as he comes to it, and tries to make
sense of it by relating it to other sections on a selective basis. But at each point we have only
a partial account, and the parts do not add up to a coherent whole ... He is honestly puzzled,
and t11e steps that he takes away from Aristotle are few and unsystematic." Huby, "Stages in
the Development of Language About Aristotle's NOlls," 142. With on ly a little hesitation, Todd
agrees to this assessment. Todd, Themistills: 0" Aristotle's 0/1 the SOIlI, 6.
7. It should be noted that there are probably many more who treat the references to the
productive and potential as twO aspects or powers of a Single intellect.
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understand how he approaches and reads texts. It is my view that care and
rigor are reflected in his treatment of noUS pathetikos. In this paper, I argue
d· cern en mat. b··
t ha t Th emi tius postulates a third intellect whose)o It IS to IS
tered forms-i.e., sensible particulars--on the reasonable assumption that the
productive and potential intellects are responsible solely for our contemplation of un-en mattered forms. As such, the passive intellect is respo nsible for
what Aristotle calls incidental perception and, thereby, plays an important
role in nearly all of our affections (pathe). It is a mistake, however, to reg~rd
Themistius's nous pathetikos as a distinct third intellect that stands alongside
its productive and potential counterparts. This intellect, I contend, emerges
as part of a larger effort to explain the intellect's relation to the rest of the
soul in light of the unique way that humans experience the world.

II
Nous pathetikos is named only once in the Aristotelian corpus. In the finaJ
remarks of De Anima III 5, Aristorie writes:
When separated it is alone the very thing it is. and this alone is immortal and eternal.
But we do nOt remember because this is impassive (apathes), but the patbttikos flOtlS is
perishable (pluhartos)- and wirhout this it thinks nothing. (430312-5)

Very little in this passage is clear and unambiguous. What we can say with
some assurance is that Aristotle here contrasts nOlls pathetikos with an intellect
(or an aspect thereof) known as the productive intellect. While the productive
intellect is said to be immortal, eternal and impassive, the contrasted intellect
is described as passive and perishable. Their roles, however, are Jargely left
undefined and it is not clear how we are to understand the final line of this
passage. Do we as individuals forget during our lives what the productive
intellect thinks? Or do we as a separated intell ect forget the content of our
lives after death? Is (discursive) thinking for the productive intellect impossible without the passive intellect? Or is it the passive intellect that thinks
with the help of the productive intellect?
Aristotle writes that the productive intellect belongs to the human soul
as cause (aition) or producer (poietikon, 430a12). This, he claims, follows
from the observation that in all of nature something serves as the matter for
that kind, another as the cause and producer. "Since in rile whole of nature
there is something [which is] the matter of each kind and another [which is]
the cause and producer .. . these distinctions must also obtain in the soul"
(430alO-14). Corresponding to the productive intellect as matter to cause
is the intellect characterized by its ab ility to become all things (430al4-15).
It is widely held that the intellect that becomes all things is the so-called
"potential" intellect described in De Anima III 4. There, Aristotle explains
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that the intellect knows and thinks by becoming its objects. (429a13-1 8).
(Aristotle uses this same formulation to describe sensory awareness. Seeing, for
instance, occurs when the eyes become in some manner colored.) The intellect
that becomes its objects is known as the potential intellect because, in order
for it to become its objects, it must be its objects potentially (429a15-16).
For this reason, Aristotle declares this intellect to have no nature of its own
other than potentialiry (429a21-22) .
The objects of tl10ught-what the intellect becomes when it thinks-are
the forms, which, in contrast to Plato, belong to material objects (432a3-6)
and, therefore, must be cognized apart from their particularizing conditions. Ie
is widely believed that the productive intellect is the cause of human intellection insofar as it is responsible for rendering the forms of objects intelligible,
whether directly or indirectly. The productive intellect might act directly on
the potentially intelligible forms (the forms represented by images [phantasmataJ of sensible particulars) in order to actualize them so that they caJi, in
turn, be received and thought by the potential intellect as universal concepts.
Conversely, the productive intellect might act on the potential intellect to
render it capable of grasping and contemplating the forms of itself. The
potential intellect is held to have no actual form or struCture of its own and,
thus, to lack the agency and actualiry required to cognize forms.
According to Themistius, the productive intellect serves as the cause and
source of human intellection by actualizing and perfecting the potential intel lect. It perfects it by combining and joining with it so that the two become
one. Themistius writes:
[The] productive intellect settles into the whole of the potential intellect, as though the
carpenter and the smith did not control their wood and bronze externally but were able to
pervade it totally. For this is how the actual intellect toO is added to the potential intellect
and becomes one with ir. For that which is of form and matter is one.· (99 ,15- 18)

~y the productive intellect ch.anl.1eling its for~s and activity to the potential
ll1tellect (100,22), the potential Intellect acqlllfes form and structur
h' h
e,w IC
.
.
"
enables It to grasp the objects of thought, to make transitions , to Com b'me
and divide thoughts, and to observe thoughts [from the perspect'lv fJ
"
.
...
eo one
another (99,9-10)-l.e., to thmk dlscul"Slvely.
In Themistius's view, the productive intellect is at Once transce d
d
.
"
n ent an
.
immanent. As a transcendent noetic entity, It remains unaffect d h
e W en It
penetrates and joins with the human soul. Accordingly, it rema'l
ns one even
though it is combined with a pluraliry of potential intellects 1h ' .
.
em lStluS,
8. With only an occasional minor modificadon, quotes from Themistius'
I
De Arli1/la are from Todd, 7bemistills: On Aristotle's 011 the 50111.
s parap Uase of the
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however, does not identify the productive intellect with Aristotle's prime
mover because he takes literally Aristotle's claim that the productive intellect
·
I' most divine
is in the sOlll (430aI3) and holds quite reasonably that Ar IStot es
.
I
intellect cannot belong to the human oul as a part. He argues that if ArIStot ~
conceived the productive intellect to be the prime mover, as Alexander °d
Aphrodisias thought, he would not have described it as "alone immortal a~
eternal." Unqualified, this description is false because the heavenly bodies
are also immortal and eternal. But if, as ThemistiuS suggests, we understand
the description ro refer only to the capacities of the human soul, it wo~ld
be accurate (103,9-19). Indeed, Themistius does not take the productlve
intellect to belong to the divine heavenly realm. In his view, its place is in
the realm of nature (100,31-7).
One might expect Themistius to identi fy nous pathetikos wi th the potential
intellect, as present day scholars typically do. It is only natural to expect the
distinction Aristotle makes at the beginning of III 5 between an intellect t11at
makes and an intellect that becomes to be the same distinction articulated at
the end of the chapter between the productive and passive intellects. In addition, Aristotle describes the proce1>S by which the intellect becomes its objects
as a kind of being affected (paschein ti, 429aI3-18), making it reasonable for
Aristotle to refer to the potential intellect as the passive intellect. Yet 111emistius takes nous pathetikos to be a corporeal intellect, "what is combined from
soul and body in which there are displays of spirit and appetites" (106,15).
Themistius maintains that his interpretation is corroborated by a passage
from De Anima I 4. The context of this passage is the possibility of the soul's
moving or being moved. Aristotle denies that the soul moves. It is not the
soul that pities or learns or thinks, but the individual (a composite of body
and soul), which does these things in virtue of the soul and the intellect in
particular (408bI3-15). Specifically, Aristotle writes:
Discursive thinking (diallomhai) , loving, and hacing are nOt aff"eccions (path!) of that
thing [i.e., the intellect]' bur of that which has it, in virtue of having it. That is why, when
this perishes, it neither remembers nor loves; they were activities not of that thing [i.e.,
the intellect]' but of the composite (IOlt koi1l01l), which has perished . (408b25-9)

Themistius takes the koinon of the above passage to refer to an intel lect that
is composite with the body, perishable and responsible for, among other
things, loving, hating, thinking and remembering. 9 It is easy to see why
9. Alexander of Aphrodisias also names a common intellect in his DeAr/ima. For Alexander,
the common intellect refers to the first level of perfection obtained by the potential intellect-i.e.,
concept mastery coupled with some layman's knowledge. It is so-called because most human
beings acquire this level of perfection and is contrasted with the acquired intellect, which is
obtained only by the disciplined and talented few. See 82,1-15 .
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1hemistius reads this pas age as a forward-looking allusion to nollS pathetikos.
Like the passive intellect, the referent of "this" and the ubjcct of "perishe "
are involved in thinking and remembering. And, of course, like the passive
intellect, it is perishable. Yet Themistius's reading of this passage is de cribed
by one scholar as "pervcrse," sincc it attributes to an intellcct the active and
passive affections that Aristotle clearly tells us belong to the individual taken
as a whole. 1o I shall argue in the sections to comc that there is no real tension
betwccn 1hemistius's reading and the text. In the remainder of this section, I
shall preliminarily address the corporeali ty of this intellcct. This, too, seems
problematic, since Aristotle nowhere (explicitly) speaks of an intellect that
is corporeal or mixed with the body. In general, the intellect is describcd
as a separate, uncompounded entity that enters the soul from without as a
complete substance. II
1hemistius does not make explicit why he distinguishes betwecn the
potential and passive intellects or why he takes the passive intell cct to be
corporeal, but it is not hard to adduce his reasoning, since his treatmcht of
nous pathetikos is consistent with his understanding of corruptibility and passivity. The first thing to note is that Themi tius has no problem attributing
passivity to the potential intellect. Indeed, he acknowledges that the potcntial
intellect is in some way affected by the objects of thought (94,5-7). Following Aristotle, Themistius recognizes two kinds of being affected (417b2-16;
56,1-12). In its strict sense, "being affected" applies to alterations in which
one thing is lost as its place is taken by another, as when the sun changes the
color of one's skin from beige to red . This type of alteration involves a loss
(i.e., the extinction of beige) and, therefore, is a change to some privation.
As 1hemistius rightly notes, t11is kind of being affected does not apply to
capacities of the soul since thcy do not suffer any loss. The sou l's activities
preserve their capacities, because passage into activity is a perfection of an
inherent nature (417b16; 56,12). In Aristotle's view, a person might lose somc
power to reason in old age because her body decays, net becausc her intellect
declines. And the same, he tells us, is true regarding the sense capacities. If an
old man were to receive a new eye, his former capacity for sight would return
bccause the Aristotelian soul is impassive: it does not move, alter or decay. 12
10. Todd makes this comment in the notes to his first translation. He writes: "This supp lement high lights Themistius's perverse in terpretation of this text; i.e., instead of accepting the
natural meaning of to koillOIi as the compound of the reasoning mcu lty and the body ... he sees
it as an intellect exclusively linked wilh the perishable body." Todd, Two Greek Aristoteliall
Commentators, 96--97 note 95. Huby reads Themistius Similarly. See Huby, "Stages in the
Development of Language About Aristotle's NailS," 141.
11. Compare De Anima 408b18- 19 and De Gm. All. 76b28.
12. It is important to note that within this discussion of the impassivity of the soul Aristotle
states that the intellect is imperishable (408bI8- 19). The intellect is imperishable insofar as all
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In Aristotle's view and according to Themist ius's paraphrase, the source of
an individual's corruption is her body. Therefore, the capacities of the soul
are affected in a secondary sense-in the sense of achieving perfection or
developing towards one's true nature.
From here it i easy to see why TIlemisrius distinguishes the passive intellect from the potential. Insofar as nous pathetikos is corruptible, it is affected
in the strict sense: a sense that cannot be applied to the potential intellect.
The intellect of III 4 is unmixed, separate from the body (429a24-5; 429b5)
and, thus, imperishable. In fact, on this line of reasoning all the capacities of
the soul are imperishable. Themistius, thus, concludes that nous pathetikos
is corruptible insofar as it is compounded with the body. The compounded
intellect perishes upon the death of the individual, even though its capacities do not.
We have, then, an explanation for why TIlemistius takes the passive
intellect to be corporeal. The question remains as to what Themistius could
mean by this, when the intellect, for Aristotle, is not the actualization of any
bodily structure. I will address this question in greater detail in the following
sections, but for now we can rule out the two most problematic interpretations: the passive intellect is neither a corporeal part of the soul that endures
the affections, nor a faculty, like the senses, that has its own organ. Given
TIlemistius's description of the passive intellect as affected and compounded
with the body, we might suppose that he conceived it as a corporeal part of
the soul that is moved when enduring the affections-that is moved w~en,
say, pitying, loving or thinking. Needless to say, this would be a serIO~s
misconstrual of Aristotle's theory of the soul and would put Aristotle 1D
line with Plato. The conception of the sou l as moved predominated among
Aristotle's predecessors and is the view against which Aristotle constructs his
own. But Themistius remains faithful to Aristotle in this regard throughout
h~s exp?sition. The soul, he reportS, neither fears, nor remembers,. nor thi~;
discurSively', for these , he writes , "are movements of the whole a11lmal by
'b'l'
agency of the intellect" (27,14). We can, then, rule out the first pOSSI Iity
I
. h'
phrase that there is
tlec..1pacitics of the soul arc imperishable.1hemiscius thus notes IJ) IS para
' .
fit
e
of
it thiS appears to
h
)
no nee d to question whether the intellect is perishable (30,1-2. 0 n t e c
' I ' h' h
aI d immorra Wit IJ) t e
b .
.
e 111 conRictwith his claim that only the productive intellect IS etern an
aI'
.
. I ' lonality and etern Ity.
sou.I Blit Incorruptibility and impassivity are not synonymous Wit limn
I I ' ks
TI
AI' otle apparent y nln ,
le soul can be impassive and immune from corruption and decay, as 1S t ·
d
f
.I
.
te and indepen ent 0
Wit lOut being eternal and immorral - nanlely, capable ofC}{lstence separ~
. lid' both
rI
. . ..
.
., d
dict himself IJ) 10 IJ)g
le composite II1dlvldual. Accordmgly, TI,emls[lus oes not contra
.
aI
I
d . . ellect is alone Immor[,
I" I Id not
t lat the potential intellect is imperishable and that the pro UC[lve Int
and
I
' f " I' I
.,
0 tal and eterna s lOll
eterna . Therefore, Tllemistiuss reading 0 (lIS a one IS Imm r
.' "Th Nature
be taken as evidence for the corruptibility 0 f tIe
I potentl'aI'mte IIect . See Mal [In,
C
of the Human Intellect," 12, for this argument.
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-that Themistius understood the passive intellect to be a corporeal part of the
sou l that endures the active and passive affection. But the evidence likewise
speaks against the second alternative-that the passive intellect has its own
organ. The passive intellect appears to actualize most often in accordance
with the activity of the heart, the seat of the sense and emotions; however,
it is not like the senses in that it does not have a proper organ through which
it actualizes. This suggests that, unlike the activity of the senses, its activity
is not in any way reducible or identical to some bodily actualization. The
activity of the pas ive intellect must, then, bear a different relation to the
body than do the other faculties of the soul.
At this point, the most we can say is that the passive intellect is some kind
of rational faculty, which actualizes thanks to the activity of the body, and
that Themistius had good reasons for distinguishing between the passive and
potential intellects. But it remains to be seen whether he has a comprehensive
theory for what this intellect is, what it does and how it fits within Aristotelian
noetics. Let us turn, then, to consider its role and function.

III
It has been suggested byO. Balleriaux l3 and]. Finamorel~ that Themistius's
conception of the passive intell ect is born out of his Platonic sympathies
and his conviction that Aristotle does not significantly diverge from Plato. IS
In particular, they maintain that Themistius's tllree intellects correspond to
Plato's bipartition of the soul in the Timaeus. The productive and potential
unity is held to be an adaptation of the immortal rational sou l, the passive
intellect a version of the mortal irrational soul. Indeed, at the end of h is discussio n on this intellect, Themistius explicitly compares the passive intellect
and Plato's mortal irrational soul. The comparison begins as fo llows:
[Aristo tlc) describes as perishable the pass ive [inrellect) in respect of which a humru1
being is something combined from soul and body in which there are displays of sp irit
aJ1d appetites. That Plato also takes these [affections) to be perishablc is clear from what
is said in the Timams. (106 ,14-16)

Themistius here remarks that Aristotle, like Plato, regards the affections as
perishable. The connection between the passive intel lect and the mortal soul
is made explicit only in the following lines, wherein he quotes a passage de13. Ballerlaux. "Themlstius et Ie Ncoplatonisme."
14. Work is in progress.

15. 1t shou ld be noted that while Balleriaux ru1d Finamore both suess the Platonic ru1d
Neoplatonlc clements of Themistius's paraphrase on the inrcllect, of the twO only Balleriaux
concludes that Themistius is Neoplatonic in his philosophical orienratio n. Finamore maintains
that Themistius is "a Peripatctic with Platonic leru1ings."
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scribing the mortal soul's nature and construction (106,16-29; 69C5-E4 and
72D4). We learn that, like the passive intellect, the mortal soul is responsi~le
for the human affections and the spirits. But the following questions anse:
How far is the comparison to be extended? Is the passive intellect just a version of the mortal soul? Is Themistius's intention here to harmonize Plato
and Aristotle? Or does he mean only to highlight some points of agreement
and nothing more?
It is instructive to begin with a reference Themistius makes to Zeno's .account of the human passions at the end of the passage cited above, as d01l1g
so will tell us a little about how Themistius uses citations or references more
generally. After explaining that the human affectio ns or emotions are, for
Aristotle, combined with reason, Themistius notes: "Zeno and his school
were not wrong in taking the emotions to be 'perversions of reason,' i.e.
mistaken judgments of reason" (107,17-18). Balleriaux makes much of the
fact that Themistius approves ofZeno's account of the affections, because he
takes him as ascribing to Aristotle a Stoic account of the emotions. For this
reason, he sees this reference to Zeno as yet another instance of The mist ius's
Neoplatonic impulse towards syncretism, arguing that this particular case
issues from Plutarch's practice of borrowing vocabulary and definitions from
the Stoics when he saw fit. 16
The problem with Balleriaux's supposition is tl1at Themistius's account
of Aristotle on the emotions does not accord with the account he attributes
to Zeno. Ballcriaux himself points out that Zeno's theory precludes animals
from having emotions, while Themistius expressly attributes emotions to them
(107,9). Indeed, he even criticizes Themistius for failing to recognize this. Yet
Balleriaux leaves unmentioned a more important difference berween the rwo
accounts-a difference that Themistius could not have failed to notice. Just
prior to referencing Zeno, Themistius reports that because human affections
involve some SOrt of judgment, they can, for Aristotle, be virtuous so long as
the accompanying judgment is correct (107,15-16). But Zeno's account of
the emotions as mistaken or perverted judgments denies that emotions can
issue from correct judgments and, hence, precludes their being virtuous.
To understand how the reference to Zeno is used, we need only to notice
that the issue under consideration is the cognitive nature of emotions and
that this is the point of connection berween Aristotle and Zeno. Themistius is
interested here in explain ing how it is that emotions, for Aristotle, are "combined with reason" (107,10-11). According to Aristotle, human emotions can
involve correct judgments; for Zeno, they can only be mistaken judgments.
We ought not, then, take Themistius's approval of Zeno too seriously, but
rather mal(e note of his guarded endorsement-"Zeno and his school," he
16. See Balleriaux, "Themistius er Ie Neoplaronisme," 187-88 and 190-97.
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write, "were not wrong." Ihey were not wrong because, in Aristotle's view,
so me emotions involve mistaken judgments. We may conclude, then, that
Themistius used Zeno here to corroborate one particular point, not to clarify
Aristotle or suggest that he held the same theory. But can we say the same
thing about his comparison of the passive intellect to Plato's mortal soul?
Let us suppose that Themistius took the passive intellect to be an adaptation of Plato's mortal soul. Because the mortal soul is irrational, we should
also suppose that, for Themistius, the part of the soul described as pathetikos
is nous in only a tangential sense. Based on this approach, the passive intellect
would have to be irrational, though not unreasonably called nous. Therefore,
our interpretation must make clear why, in Themistius's view, Aristotle would
call this pathetikos part of the soul nous.
It is plaUSible that the passive intellect is identical, not to the whole of
the irrational soul, but to phantasia, since images are a kind of pathos (88,35;
450a1, 26) and phantasia a bridge between sensation and intellection. In fact,
Ihemistius does take phantasia to be a capacity lyi ng "in a no man's land"
insofar as it is superior to sense-perception but much inferior to di cursive
reasoning (88,26-27). It would, then, be reasonable for him to describe
phantasia as not/so Furthermore, the identification of the passive intellect
to phantasia looks promising in light of the shared activities to which both
faculties are assigned (both faculties are somehow involved in remembering
and discursive reasoning) and the dependence of these two faculties on the
body.
IfThemistius does take the passive intellect to be phantasia, his theory of
nous pathetikos would anticipate Philoponus and Stephanus,I7 adding support to Balleriaux's contention that Themistius's conception of nous pathetikos is formed under the influence of Neoplatonism. Yet Ihemistius denies
that phantasia is an intellect. Phantasia, he reports, is not the same as nous
(89,24-25; 91,20-21) because it has no share of reason (90,25). Moreover, he
appears to distinguish phantasia from the passive intellect. Upon explaining
that phantasia does not involve opinion or belief, he writes:
But if there is a [kind of] intellect that can also err, and make Fa.be as well as true claims,

phart,asia is not easily distinguished from it, when [such an intellect] is so similar. First,
there is precisely what I have mentioned, their [shared] capacity to err; then there is the
fact that it is equally in our power to think what we wish and to engage in imagining.
So let us inquire into the difference between phalltasia and the sort of intellect [involved
in such thinking) in due course. (91,24-29)

17. See Blumenthal, "Notls Pathetikos in Later Greek Philosophy," for interpretations of
patMtikos in later Greek philosophy and especially 203- 05. Blumenthal has surprisingly

,lOlts

li ttle to say about 111emistius's interpretation. He takes the passive intellect to be an aspect of
a single intellect that is able to become the form it thinks.
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The intellect here contrasted with phantasia-me intellect capable of error
-can only be the passive intellect. The passive intellect is associated wim the
affections, which, as we have seen, can involve mistaken judgment, it is the
lowest of me intellectual faculties, and it is the intellect that bears the most
resemblance to phantasia. Unfortunately, Themistius does not, as promised,
explicitly discuss the difference between these two faculties. Nevertheless, we
can preliminarily conclude mat me passive intellect cannot be undersrood
imply in comparison to the mortal soul and be sure that an investigation
into phantasia will prove useful for our inquiry.
According to C. Steel and H. Blumenthal phantasia, for Themistius, is a
passive capacity deriving from me senses. IS This interpretation stems from me
emphasis he places on two passages in particular, which, when taken rogemer,
appear to suggest that phantasia is parasitic on the senses. Themistius takes
as canonical (a) passage 428blO-17 of De Anima III 3, wherein Arisrode
describes phantasia as a motion brought about by and similar in character
to sense-perception, and (b) passage 450a29-31 of De Memoria, wherein
Aristotle says that the motion of sense-perception is like a stamp wh ich
produces a picture-like imprint. Themistius, for instance, writes:
[Imagination is that] in respect of whidl we say that so me image (phalltas:lla) COI~es
to exist in us as a kind of imprint (tttpos) and form (morphE! of the sense-ImpreSSIOn

(aisthbna) in the sou l. (89,29-31)
Imagination is [by definition] an imprint (l1Ipos) and trace (ichnos). (91,12-17)
[The] trace (ie/mos) that sense-perception retained in extending out to the extern:ti object
of perception becomes an object for imagination, just as though the wax receIved the
ft
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.
.
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in keeping with Aristotle, he takes its operations to occur simultaneously
with sense-perception (92,4-7; 93,1), and elsewhere he describes it as active.
"Imagination," he writes, "is in our power whenever we wish to establish it
as a foundation for thought" (88,36). There is, then, an apparent tension
between his treatments of phantasia as a by-product of sense-perception,
on the one hand, but as simultaneous with and superior to it, on the other
hand. But Themistius does not view the activ ity of phantasia as a mere byproduct of sensation . He explains that in order for phantasia to preserve and
recognize the trace (phantasma) as a representation of some external object,
it must be "active towards the object of perception at just the same time as
sense-perception" (93,1). The difficulty for Themistius is to explain how the
two facu lties differ, especially given that the twO can be active simultaneously. Themistius's answer is that while the senses focus on (apereidetai) the
external sensible object, phantasia focuses on the imprint or form received
by the senses (92,6-12). He appears, then, to conceive phantasia as involving
some kind of awareness of the image.
Our interpretation so far recognizes only minor differences between
phantasia and sense-perception. Phantasia, on this account, is sti ll just an
image-making faculty with no power for cognitive judgment or interpretation. It is aware of its objects in the very same way as the senses. We might
wonder, then, why ll1emistius insists that phantasia is superior to the
senses. Moreover, we might wonder whetl1er Themistius has satisfactorily
distinguished between the two facu lties. Indeed, R. Todd is deeply critical of
Themistius (and all the other ancient commentators) for assumingphantasia
to be an image-making faculty. In his view, such an interpretation cannot
adequately explain its operations, especial ly when it is active simultaneously
with sense-perception. "Images," he notes, "are ... an embarrassment until
perception has ceased, granted that they cannot be integrated into an analysis
of perception itself."20
Themistius, however, does not always treat phantasia as an image-making
faculty. When clarifying p;v;sage 429b1 0-22, wherein Aristotle describes the
objects of the intellect, ll1emistius gives phantasia the power to recognize
sensory data as objects. ll1at is to say, he gives to phantasia the power to assign concepts to sensibles perceived. He writes:
If rhis is indeed rhe case, rhen when we discern (krillfhnm) rhe fo rm (morpbell) in irs
conjunction wirh rhe marrer, as, for example, cold and wer wirh matter (this is when
we discern water as a whole, for warer is the rario (logos) of these [two] qualiries and
rheir combi narion with rhe marrer), and discern warer as a who le, or flesh as a whole,
rhe capaciry for sense-perception (or rarher, its partner pharltflSia) is adequare for us.

(96,8-13)
20. Todd, "lh em isrius and rhe Traditional Interpreration of Aristotle's lheory of PhalltaSi(l,"

52.
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Themistius here explains that when we discern water as a whole we sens
the proper sensibles-wet and cold-and grasp the form (morphe; or logos o
these qualities inhering in matter. Wet and cold are among the proper object
of touch; they arc per se objects of sense-perception. Grasping the morphe o
logos such that we thereby grasp what kind of object it is would seem to require
a faculty that takes us beyond the capacity of the senses. Indeed, that is why
Aristotle calls this discernment "incidental perception": perceiving that the
wet and cold before me is water is incidental to the operation of the senses.
However, it is implied here that imagination does just that: it discerns the
sensible forms in conjunction with the morphe and logos of matter.
C. Kahn criticized Themistius in particular, but the ancient commentators more generally, for giving to the sense-faculties the power to discern
objects while failing to notice that in and of themselves they are capable
of discerning only sensible forms like wet and cold. 21 As Kahn notes, this
kind of discernment requires the use of concepts and, hence, the intellect.
Themistius did not, however, fail to notice that object recognition involves
nous. Just after makingphanttlSia responsible for this task, Themistius explains
that the intellect also plays a role:
But when we examine what it is to be water and what it is to be Resh, what does the
discerning is quite different, or [the same thing] in a different state. For perhaps just as
there has to be a single c.'pacity to discern that sweet [taste] is distinct rrom gold [color],
so correspondingly must this capacity that discerns that water and what it is to be water
are disrincr also be single, and ir musr perceive them both, yer in twO different states
when it inspects the matter along with the form, and when it exrracrs and separates the
form. This is because in relation to water it needs phallfasia to report [to it from senseperception], but in relation to what it is to be water it is self-sufficient. (96,13-21)

This passage directly follows the conclusion made at 96,13 that phanttlSia
discerns water as a whole and the interest of this passage is the same: it is the
question of what discerns the compound objects-the en mattered forms.
We can assume, then, that the above passage serves to clarify the preceding
conclusion that phantflSia discerns the compound object, though here he
concludes that the intellect is responsible for this task.
Themistius's reason for thinking that the intellect discerns the compound
object recalls an earlier discussion in De Anima III 2, wherein Aristotle argued that the senses must be united in order for them to recognize that two
qualities belong to a single object. Themistius argues that since the intellect
is able to discern and judge that water and the form of water (the what it
is to be water) are distinct, it must be a single faculty that perceives them
both: a single faculty capable of being in different states. This, then, is how
21. Kahn, "Aristotle on 1l1inking," 371-72, note 24.
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he interprets Aristotle's remark that what apprehends the form or essence is
"either separate from the sense-faculty or related to it as a bent line to the same
li ne when straightened" (429b16-17). 1he intellect, Themistius explains,
"becomes li ke a compound (sunthetos) (when it thinks what is compounded),
yet at other times like omething uncompounded (haplous) (when it extracts
just tlle form)" (96,24-26).
The shift we see in 96,8-21 from the claim that phantasia discerns the
objects as a whole to the claim that the intellect does so as a compound,
indicates that phantasia operates in conjunction with the intellect when
making these kinds of judgments. When discerning water, the intellect, we
are told, "needs phantasia to report to it" (96,20). It is reasonable to assume
that the compounded intellect mentioned at 96,25 is the passive intellect,
since it is combined with body and soul, while the potential and productive
unity is wholly un mixed and uncompounded (haplous) with body (97,25-26).
Passage 96,8-21, thus, tells us something about how the pas ive intellect is
combined of body and soul. The passive intellect is so-called neither bec~use
it is corporeal nor because it is the actualization of an organ. It is so-cal led
because it is dependent upon the body for its activity. It needs the body for
its operation (96,20) because its actualization relies upon the activity of the
body or phantasia. 1hus, pace Todd, Themistius has integrated phantasia into
his analysis of sense-perception and intellection.
It is notable that in the final sentence of our passage, the compounded
intellect is contrasted with an intellect described as self-sufficient-an
intellect that does not need phantasia for its operation because it cognizes
matterless fo rm.
[In) relation to water it needs the phalltasia to report [to it from sense-perception). but
in relation to what it is to be water it is self-sufficient (96.19- 21).

Presumably, the "self-sufficient" intellect is the potential and productive unity,
for the potential intellect, we are told, thinks the forms thanks to the agency it
acquires from the productive intellect. 22 The above passage, however, suggests
that the compounded and self-sufficient intellects are one and the same. I
will say more about this in the final section. But let us here note that we are
now in a position to understand how the passive intellect is involved in the
diverse activities and affections ascribed to it. Insofar as it is responsible for
incidental perception, it is involved in our ability to remember, think about
22. Interestingly. what this reading of the productive and potential intellect implies is that
they do not depend upon phalltasmata for the contemplation of form. They might operate in
conjunction with phamasia in order to make thinking possible for the individual. However, if
they are truly self-sufficient. they will not grasp the form via abstraction or the dematerialization of the phalltasma.
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practical matters, acquire knowledge, and think discursively about anything
that requires images. Furthermore, it plays a role in the emotions. As Themistius explains, the human affections have two aspects for Aristotle: one that is
rational, the other that is bodily. The rational aspect of the emotion is a type
of discernment-a judgment such as 'this situation before me is fearful ' or
'th is situation gives me hope.' These discernments are accompanied by certain
bodily respo nses. In the ca e of fear, for instance, it would be the cooling
and contraction of the heart (27,8-25). The passive intellect is responsible
for the discernment of those concrete particulars.
We may conclude, then, that Themistius's account of the passive intellect stems neither from a careless misreading of the text nor merely from an
impulse to Platonize Aristotle. 23 Themistius's nous pathetikos answers a need
for an account of incidental perception, since the discernment of enmattered
objects seems not to be in the purview of either the senses or the intellect.
The senses perceive only sensible qualities like white, cold and sweet, but
that is a far cry from perceiving objects. Discerning the sensibles as particular
objects involves the application of concepts, which requires the intellect.
Yet in De Anima III 4 and 5, we are told (a) that the objects of the intellect
are simply the forms and (b) that thinking is not the actualization of any
bodily activity. It is, thus, implied that the intellect does not need or use the
body when cognizing its proper objects. The thinking of concrete sensible
particulars, by contrast, docs req uire the body. Themistius understood the
need to construct an explanation of incidental perception, and developed
an original and sophisticated account-an account that explains how nous
pathetikos, which as an intellect should be neither passive (strictly speaking)
nor perishable, can be both.

IV
The interpretation of the passive intellect that I have been advancing
provides a coherent and consistent account of the disparate affections and
activities that belong to it. Still, we might wonder whether Themistius posits a whole new noetic entity for this purpose. If the noetic component. of
the passive intellect were a third entity apart from the potential-productive
compound (and thus if the passive intellect were truly distinct from the other
two), the difficulty wou ld be to explain how it relates to its more perfect
counterparts. The passive intellect is responsible for bringing knowle~g~ to
bear on the information received from the senses; hence, jfit were a dlstll1ct
,
. ~ I h 11
tius was interested in promot23. One can see from Vanders poel s portra,~ t at lemes
c
c
I I"
t rest stems not so much Hom a
k" d
I
ing harmony in all aspects of life and, thererore, t lat liS In e
.
I' . aI and social out/oo . van erspoe,
Neoplatonic co mmitment, but rather from a certalll po mc

77mn~stitls and th~

Imperial Court.

88

MYRNA GABBE

third faculty, Themistius would be hard pressed to explain its function. But
the evidence suggests that nous pathetikos is not a third type of noetic entity
alongside the productive and potential intellects. Themistius intimates that
there is only a single human intellect-the potential, productive uni ty-and
that this intellect is capable of existing in different states. The following passage, for instance, treats the compounded and uncompounded intellect as
one and the same:
For the intellect is assimilated to the objects that it thinks, and sometimes becomes like
a compound (when it thinks what is compou nded), yet at other times like something
uncompou nded (when it abstracts just the form). (96,24-6)

Furthermore, if the passive intellect were truly distinct, our intellects could not
recognize that the form of an object and the compounded object are different
(96,13-2 1). Recall that Themistius argues that the faculty that apprehends
concrete particulars must be the same as the faculty that apprehends JUSt the'
forms, otherwise we would not be able to judge the particular as distinct
from its form . We can conclude, then, that the passive intellect cannot be
a third noetic entity. It appears, rather, to arise thanks to the form-matter
hierarchical structure that determines the relationship between the soul's
faculties. Consider the following passage on the essentiality of the intellect
for the human being:
What it is to be me comes from the soul, yet from it not in its totality-not, that is,
from the capacity for perception, which is matter for imagination, nor again from the
potential intellect, which is matter for the productive. Whar it is to be me therefore
comes from the ptoductive intellect alone, since this alone is form in a precise sense,
and indeed is a 'form of forms: and the other [forms) are substrates as well as forms, and
nature ptogressed by using them as forms for less valuable [subsuates), and as matter
for more valuable [forms). (100,28-35)

The structure of the soul is described as follows. Sensation is matter for
imagination, which is matter for the potential intellect, which is matter for
the productive intellect. The productive intellect stands at the top as the 'form
of forms' (100,33), since it serves as matter for no higher faculty or entity.
Notably absent from this hierarchy is the passive intellect. Only the faculties
that are explicitly dealt with in the De Anima get a rung on the ladder. We
have good reason to suppose, then, that the passive intellect arises thanks to
the form-matter relationship of the faculties listed above. The "human intellect" certainly does. It arises from the unity of the potential and productive
intellects and its job is to conceive, synthesize and contemplate the intelligible forms. By parallel analysis, the passive intellect ought to arise from
the form-matter unity comprised of the potential intellect, or perhaps the

THEMISTIUS AS A COMMENTATOR ON AtUSTOTLE

human intellect, and imagination . If this is the intent, then passive intellect
is defined by its relation to its particular objects (i.e., the sensible particulars)-which it has thanks to the collaborative efforts of the two facu lties
involved. And it is important to note that this interpretation is consistent
with the way that Themistius speaks of intellects elsewhere. Although he
mentions a practical (114,3) and theoretical intellect (102,11 ; 103,8; 114,4),
he certainly does not mean to posit further noetic entities. These intellects,
just as the passive intellect, are so-cal led by reference to their objects and
function. The tension, then, between Themistius's reading of 408b25-9 and
the text is resolved. Themistius does not take to koinon as a third corporeal
intellect. Like the rest of us, he reads to koinon as describing the cooperative
efforrs of the intellect and the body.
If this analysis is correct, then our investigation into the passive intellect
reveals something interesting about Themistius's approach to the De Anima.
Notice that the above passage addresses the question of how the intellect
relates to the rest of the soul. This relation has troubled interpreters from
Theophrastus to the present day. Indeed, it is likely that Themistius gets this
worry from Theophrastus, since he is our source for Theophrastus on this
issue. However, the framing of the problem has shifted since ancient times.
Contemporary scholars are apt to construe the problem as pertaining to the
unity of the soul. In De Anima 1l 1, Aristotle defines the soul as the form or
first actuality of a body with the p tentiality forlife (412a19-21; 412b4-6).
Although the intellect is treated a a parr of the soul, in III 4 and 5 Aristotle
24
makes clear that it is not the actualization of any bodily structure.
What is intriguing is that neither Themistius nor Theophrastus perceived
a conflict between Aristotle's hylomorphic soul and his immaterial intellect:
both assume the intellect to belong essentially to the rest of the soul. The
question for them is how this is possible, when it enters from without. In
the words ofTheophrastus, the intell ect wou ld seem to be "as if added (epithetos)" (107,32). Theophrastus addresses this worry by placing the intellect
within the soul at the first generation of the embryo. In this way, it is not
"as if added," since it is connate. Themistius, by contrast, maintains that the
intellect dictates the nature and structure of our body and soul. (Matter, in
Aristotle's view, is hypothetically necessary for form . Hence the faculty that
is tlle form offorms will influence the facu lties that serve a matter.) Thus for
Themistius we are not an intellect housed in an animal's body. We do not
have dual n~tures, as Kahn, for instance, suggests. 25 TIle unity and complexity
24. See Modrak, "111e Nous-Body Problem" for a clear anicu lation of the problem.
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of the human experience, as Themistius understands it, demands an account
of the intellect's influence on the rest of the soul. 111e passive intellect, we
can now see, lies at the center of this story.
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